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PREFACE 
"Timing is all important," 
- Ernesto Javier 
1 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic theory of clubs is aimed at filling in the "awesome 
Samuelson gap" [5, p. l] between the existing theories of purely public 
and purely private goods. It should be recalled that a purely public 
good is one that is completely non-rival in consumption. If additional 
people consume a fixed quantity of a public good, the utility of those 
already consuming the good is unaffected. On the other hand, private 
goods are completely rival in consumption. If one person consumes a 
given quantity of a private good, that amount is simply unavailable to 
anyone else. However, there is a group of goods and services which fall 
into the gap between these categories. These are goods that can be 
shared, unlike private goods, but not endlessly so, as with public goods. 
Such items are sometAiere between the two extremes, and are known as 
impurely public or club goods. 
A common exançle of a club good is a swimming pool. Unlike a purely 
private good, more than one person can use the pool at the same time. 
However, as more and more people get into the pool, the enjoyment of 
those already in it diminishes. In a word, the pool gets conjested. 
This situation creates a classic economic problem. Because the pool 
can be shared, per-person cost can be reduced if a club^ is formed and 
the facility is shared. The more people there are in the club, the 
^t should be noted that clubs may be either public or private. 
Individuals may join together to form a club, or may create a governmental 
unit for the same purpose. However, this dissertation implicitly assumes 
that the clubs discussed are public. 
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lower the per-person. cost, but the more congested the pool will be. The 
"right" number of people for the club depends upon the members' 
evaluation of the gains to be made from lowering per-person cost and the 
losses to be sustained from additional congestion. It is entirely possible 
that an individual will be rich enough and sufficiently averse to 
congestion that he will buy his own pool. Note that the swimming pool is 
still a club good, despite the fact that it is owned by a single person. 
Property rights do not alter the intrinsic nature of goods. Thus, many 
goods generally considered private goods (such as televisions and 
automobiles) are by nature actually club goods. 
Congestion manifests itself in tiie swimming pool \Aien the addition of 
extra swimmers inhibits one's ability to swim about freely. However, 
congestion takes on different forms with different types of club goods, A 
congested tennis court, for example, is not one where there is not enough 
room to swing a racket, but rather tdiere there are more people wanting to 
play than for whom there is room. The result is the creation of a waiting 
line or "queue", and the congestion costs manifest themselves in terms of 
waiting time costs. Likewise, a congested fire suppression system is one 
•vdiere there are more fires than units available to put them out. Once 
again, congestion costs appear in terms of time; in this case, time 
spent waiting for a fire-fighting unit to become available. 
It should be obvious that, all else equal, increasing the number of 
people in the tennis club or fire suppression system will increase the 
amount of time one might expect to wait for an open court or a free fire 
truck. These time costs must therefore be weighed against the reductions 
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in per-per son cost of providing the club good that stem from increasing 
club membership. But increasing club membership has one additional 
implication: it increases the physical size of the club's "district". 
Fire trucks -will spend more time in transit between fires in larger 
districts, ceteris paribus, and tennis players will spend more time 
traveling to and from the courts. Additional space thereby translates into 
additional time. 
Surprisingly, the fomal economic theory of clubs has so far 
virtually ignored these important spatial and temporal considerations [31]. 
Some work has been done along these lines, but almost exclusively by 
operations research practitioners [4, 6, 7, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Thus, 
no effort has been made to incorporate this work into a more general 
theoretical framework such as the economic theory of clubs. 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to take a step towards 
eliminating this deficiency by integrating spatial and temporal 
considerations into the economic theory of clubs. In so doing, certain 
techniques developed by the operations research discipline have been used, 
with the secondary purpose of making economists aware of the work being 
done in that area. In addition, this dissertation incorporates a Von 
Neuman-Morganstem ^proach to expected utility maximization. This idea 
also has never been used in conjunction with formal club theory [31]. 
Chapters II and III of this work focus on these issues as they apply 
to local emergency services, with a special emphasis on fire suppression 
systems. Chapter IV extends the analysis to include man-made recreational 
facilities, with tennis courts being used as a specific example. 
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CHAPTER II. FIRE SUPPRESSION DISTRICTS: A GENERAL MODEL 
The Elements of the Problem 
In an emergency, time is of the essence. The longer a fire bums, 
for exanç)le, the more damage it will do. The goal of every fire 
suppression service is, therefore, to minimize the length of time a 
fire bums, given the ever-present cost constraint. 
The total time that a fire bums depends upon four things: 
detection and reporting time, queuing time, travel time, and service 
time. Detection and reporting time is the time that elapses between 
the moment the fire starts and the moment it is reported to the fire 
station. To a large extent, this variable cannot be influenced by 
changes in the configuration of the fire district (i.e. by having more 
fire companies^ or fewer people in the "club"). Fire detection and 
reporting is for the most part the responsibility of the individual, 
who may choose to install smoke detectors or similar devices. Hence, 
detection and reporting time is a variable assumed to be exogenous to 
the model, since it is beyond the control of the group (with the possible 
exception of building code legislation, but that is beyond the scope of 
this work). 
Queuing time is the time that elapses between the moment the fire 
station receives the report of a fire and the moment a fire conçany 
^The phrase "fire company" will be used to refer to a standard fire-
fighting xmit. Surprisingly, there has been very little research done on 
the nuts and bolts issues of how many fire-figjhters to put into each 
company, the types of tmcks to use, etc. [33]. Hence, the exact 
composition of each fire company is assumed to be exogenously determined. 
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becomes available to respond to the report. With the assxmption of 
autonomous fire districts, if all fire companies are already busy, the 
caller must vaxt until one finishes its current task before one can 
respond to his alarm. There is a branch of operations research devoted 
to the study of queues, and Appendix A of this paper offers the reader 
an introduction to the area. As shall become apparent later on, 
changing the configuration of the fire district can significantly affect 
queuing time. 
Travel time is the time that elapses between the moment a fire 
company is dispatched to a fire and the moment it arrives on the scene. 
All else equal, the more people there are in the fire district, the 
larger the physical size of the district, and hence, the greater average 
or median travel time will be. 
Service time is the amount of time that elapses between the moment 
the fire company arrives at the scene of the fire and the moment the 
fire is finally extinguished. Service time depends upon a variety of 
factors including the training of the fire company, its size, the 
technology it possesses, and the nature of the particular problem at 
hand. Since the composition of a fire company has been assumed to be 
exogenously determined, it follows that service time is also an 
exogenous variable. Note, however, that both service time and travel 
time indirectly influence queuing time, since the quicker a unit can 
get to and extinguish a fire, the sooner it will be available for 
another assignment. 
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The Decision-Making Framework 
As indicated above, the two variables that can be affected by 
altering the configuration of fire districts are queuing time and travel 
time. Queuing time, once determined, will be the same for everyone in 
the district. The origin of the call for help in no way affects the 
probability that the fire companies will all be busy. However, travel 
time depends upon where the individual lives relative to the fire station. 
Someone living adjacent to the fire station can expect travel time to be 
much less than it would be for someone living a few miles away. This 
observation is important t^en considering how different individuals 
perceive the "efficiency" of a particular district configuration. 
One issue to be decided is the level of per-person cost (or "dues" 
in club theory jargon). With the assumption of equal cost sharing, 
determining the level of dues is equivalent to determining the ratio of 
fire companies (S) to people in the district (N). This is because total 
cost is equal to the (annualized) cost of each fire company (C) times 
the number of companies. Hence, cost per-person is (C*S)/N. With C 
given and independent of S, there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
dues and S/N. 
But determining S/N is only part of the story. For a given S/N, 
the levels of S and N must still be decided. If, for example, 
S/N = 1/10,000, one must determine Aether the district should contain 
1 fire company and 10,000 people, 2 conçanies and 20,000 people, or 10 
conçanies and 100,000 people. Obviously, including more people in the 
district will increase travel time to the people living at the outer 
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edge of the district. However, increasing S and N proportionally will 
reduce mean queuing time. This economy of scale in queuing time is "a 
property which is common to nearly all realistic queuing models" [6, 
p. 18]o An interesting political problem thus arises because people 
living near the fire station will want S and N to increase indefinitely 
(given S/N), since it will reduce queuing time without affecting travel 
time to them. However, as N increases, people living on the boundary 
will expect large travel times, and will therefore desire smaller 
districts. The equilibrium sized district (again, given S/N) postulated 
in this work is where the (expected) utility of the individuals living 
the median distance from the center of the district is greater than the 
(expected) utility of individuals living the median distance from the 
center of any other sized district. (Appendix B shows how median 
distance is calculated. It also demonstrates that median distance is 
larger than mean distance. Thus, the result obtained here is certainly 
different from that v^ch would occur under a "veil of ignorance". 
Under such a veil, "no one knows his place in society" [28, p. 12], so 
no one would have any idea idiere the fire stations would be located. 
If everyone were risk neutral, they would vote such that the district 
were configured so as to maximize the expected utility of the individual 
living the mean distance from the center of the district. If risk 
aversion were prevalent, district size would depend upon the degree of 
risk aversion, and would coincide with the result obtained here only by 
accident.) The equilibrium is also sensitive to agenda control and other 
public choice issues beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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Having determined ^at S and N will be for each possible S/N, 
every individual will know his position relative to the fire station for 
every S/N, and will vote so as to maxiniize his own expected utility. By 
invoking the median voter theorem in a majority-rules voting framework, 
it can be argued that the median preference will dominate [24]. 
The Nature of the Utility Function 
The model presented here defines utility as being a function of 
wealth (Z). Mathematically, U = TJ(Z). The amount of wealth an 
individual possesses depends upon his initial endowment, payments made 
for services to protect that endowment (dues), and potential loss due 
to fire. 
Since the need for an emergency service such as a fire suppression 
company is uncertain, behavior consistent with the Von Neuman-Morganstem 
expected utility maximization hypothesis is postulated. The essence of 
this hypothesis is that under conditions of uncertainty, individuals 
will behave so as to maximize the expected value of utility. (Proofs 
of this contention, given the necessary assumptions, can be found in 
References 15, 18, and 39.) 
In this chapter, no restrictions are placed on the form of the 
utility function. For illustrative purposes, a risk averse utility 
function will be employed (i.e. U'(Z) > 0, T?'(Z) < 0, -siiere U'(Z) and 
U"(Z) are the first and second derivatives of utility with respect to 
wealth), but the model is applicable to other utility functions as well. 
In the next chapter, a risk neutral utility function will be specified 
which will allow us to simplify the analysis. 
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Choosing S and N for Each Level of Per-Person Cost 
As noted above, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
level of per-person cost (dues) and the ratio of fire conçanies to 
people (S/N). It was also noted that S and N were chosen for a particular 
S/N so as to make the expected utility of the individuals living the 
median distance from the center of the district greater than the expected 
utility of similarly placed individuals in alternatively sized districts. 
This section describes that process. 
Figure 1 below displays two rays from the origin, labeled (S/N)^ 
and (S/N)2. 
S 
1 
0 N 
Figure 1, Iso-dues lines 
Along each ray, S/N is constant. If the cost of each fire company 
is independent of the number hired, then along each r^ per-person cost 
or dues is also constant. Since (S/N)2 > (S/N)^, dues for (S/N)2 are 
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greater than dues for (S/N)^ [1, 2, 3], The task is to choose a 
particular ray, and then to locate the appropriate S and N. 
is defined as wealth net of dues. Therefore, = Z - dues, and 
is the value of wealth if there is no fire, z is defined as wealth 
a 
that is not subject to fire damage (money in a savings account, for 
example). Hence, Z^ is the value of wealth if a catastrophic fire occurs 
•vâiich destroys all burnable wealth. - Z^ is thus the amount of 
wealth subject to loss by fire. 
It is hypothesized that loss due to fire (L) is a function of the 
length of time the fire bums (T). Mathematically, L = L(T). The shape 
of this loss function depends upon a variety of factors including the 
construction of the building, the nature of its contents, the number of 
doors and windows, climatic conditions, and the value of the building 
and its contents. In this chapter, no restrictions are placed on the 
shape of the loss function, though for illustrative purposes it is 
drawn such that L'(T) > 0 and L"(T) > 0. In the next chapter, it will 
be assumed to be linear to simpliJ^ the analysis. 
Let Pj, be the probability that a fire will occur at any particular 
residence (assumed to be equal for everyone). Expected utility for any 
individual can then be expressed as^ 
& 
E[U(Z)] = (1 - Pj,)[U(Zj^)] + Pj. J U(Z)f(Z)dZ 
^a 
"This foirmulation is standard, and can be found in Reference 35, 
for example. 
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where f(Z) is t±e probability density function of wealth in the event of 
a fire. This density function is derived from the probability density 
function of T and from the loss function L(T). 
Since T is the sum of four random variables (detection and reporting 
time, queuing time, travel time, and service time), its density function 
is obtained from the density functions of its four-component random 
variables. (An example of the general technique is presented in 
Appendix C.) 
The probability density function of T is also the probability 
density function of L, since P(T=t) = P(L(T) = L(t)). In other words, 
if is the probability that the fire will bum for a period of time, 
t, then P^ is the probability that loss will be L(t), 
Similarly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between loss and 
wealth remaining after the fire. If loss due to fire is L(t), then 
wealth must be - L(t). Therefore, if loss L(t) occurs with 
probability P^, wealth - L(t) occurs with probability P^. The 
probability density function of T is, therefore, transformed into the 
probability density function of wealth, f(Z). The idea is illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
The diagram in the northwest quadrant shows the probability density 
function of T, and shows the probability of a fire burning for any 
particular length of time, t. The graph in the southwest comer shows 
the loss function, L(T). The probability of any particular amount of 
loss, L(t),can be seen by going directly north to the probability density 
function of T. Note that loss due to fire can be a maximum of Z^ - Z^, 
12 
P(T=t) 
L(T) L(T) 
L(T) 
0 Z T Z 0 
Figure 2. Deriving f(Z) 
13 
since by definition is wealth that will still exist even if the fire 
destroys all flammable wealth. 
The picture in the southeast quadrant translates loss into remaining 
wealth. If loss is zero, then wealth is - 0 = Z^: If loss is 
Zjj - Z^5 then wealth is Z^ - (Z^ - Z^) = Z^. Since one can determine the 
probability of loss being any particular amount, L(t), one can also 
determine the probability of wealth being any particular amount, 
Z^ - L(t). Finally, by moving up to the utility function in the 
northeast quadrant, one can determine the utility of any particular 
level of wealth. 
The position of the utility function obviously depends upon the 
exact function specified. In the risk averse case pictured, the function 
is concave from below. A risk neutral utility function would be linear, 
and a risk loving utility function would be convex from below. 
The location of Z^ in the southeast comer depends upon the 
individual's initial endowment of wealth, as well as dues (which are a 
function of C). The location of Z^ depends upon the fraction of Z^ that 
the individual had in a form not subject to fire damage. 
The shape of the probability density function of T as depicted in 
Figure 2 is some^Aiat arbitrary, since its exact shape depends upon the 
density functions of the conçonent variables (please see Appendix C). 
Note, however, that even with S/N fixed, the shape of this density 
function will change as S and N change. As previously indicated, 
increasing S and N (S/N constant) will cause the mean of the queuing 
time density function to decline, but the mean of the travel time density 
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function will increase (a larger N implies a physically larger district). 
The S and N -wfaLch ultimately result in the f(Z) which generates the 
greatest expected utility for the individuals living the median distance 
from the center of the district will be chosen. Designate these values 
* , * 
as S and N . 
Unfortunately, the complexity of the queuing time equation and the 
difficulty of calculating the probability density function of T (please 
see Appendices A and C) preclude an analytic solution to this problem. 
The purpose of Chapter III, therefore, is to examine the model under 
certain simplifying assumptions. These assuiig)tions will still not 
allow for an exact analytic solution, but they will allow solutions to 
be obtained by means of simulations. 
The Expansion Path and the Choice of S/N 
tit yt 
By calculating S and N for each S/N, an entire set of equilibrium-
sized districts is identified. This collection of points is known as 
an expansion path, and delineates the district configurations potentially 
available. Along an expansion path, a larger S/N implies both better 
service and higher dues. Off the expansion path, a larger S/N still 
implies higher dues, but not necessarily better service [2]. Note that 
the position of the expansion path depends upon all of the elements needed 
to choose each S and N , including the utility function. 
Given the S and N that will prevail for each S/N, each voter will 
desire the S/N that will maximize his expected utility. In this 
situation, each person knows the travel time and queuing time that will 
be associated with each level of dues. A larger S/N will affect expected 
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utility in two w^s. First, the mean of the probability density function 
of T will be reduced. Secondly, dues will increase, so (and probably 
Z^) will be reduced. Figure 3 compares two alternatives, (S/N)^ and 
(S/N) ,^ where (S/N)^ > (S/N)^. 
By choosing (S/N)2» the individual will have a higher probability 
of fire being extinguished sooner than if he were to choose (S/N)^, 
However, his wealth in the event that there is no fire is reduced by 
the amount of extra dues from Zjj^ to Zjj^- Mathematically, the individual 
must compare the value of expected utility with (S/N)2 to that with 
(S/N)-, i.e. compare 
E[U(Z)]2 = (1 - Pp)CU(Zjj^)] + Pj. J U(Z)f2(Z)dZ 
E[U(Z)]^ = (1 - Pp)[U(Zjj )] + Pp J U(Z)fj^(Z)dZ . 
' S 
Each individual will select the S/N that produces the largest 
E[U(Z)]. Obviously, different individuals will have different 
preferences. Wealth, utility functions, location (and hence, f(Z)) will 
all differ from person to person. In addition, the fraction of wealth 
kept "out of harm's way" (Z^) will differ, as mi^t detection and 
reporting time (due to individual efforts to install smoke alarms, etc.). 
The loss function will also vary from individual to individual, as it 
depends on a variety of personal factors described before. The 
individual with the median preference will dominate in the choice of 
S/N in a majority-rules voting framework. Note that this individual 
16 
U(Z) P(T=t) U(Z) 
T 0 Z 0 
L(T) 
L(T) L(T) 
T 0 Za Za. 0 
Figure 3, Two points on the expansion path con^ared 
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need not be among the individuals living the median distance from the 
center of any particular district. Individuals choose their expected 
tit ît 
utility maximizing S/N given the S and N associated vith each S/N. 
With that information, they will know where they will live relative to 
the fire station for each S/N, and will vote on the basis of that 
information. 
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CHAPTER III. FIEE SUPPRESSION DISTRICTS: A RESTRICTED MODEL 
The Nature and Purpose of the Restrictions 
This chapter -will employ the same model as presented in the previous 
chapter, but with three modifications. The first is the restriction 
that all utility functions be risk neutral. According to the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of absolute risk aversion [27], an individual is risk neutral if 
his utility function is such that: 
Since the second derivative of any linear function is equal to zero, a 
linear utility fxmction is a risk neutral utility function. One such 
utility function is U = bZ, where b is a positive constant, and Z is 
wealth as before. However, all Von Neuman-Morganstem utility functions 
are unaffected by linear transformations [18, p. 36], so the above 
function may be multiplied by 1/b. The resulting function, U = Z, will 
be the function used here. 
The second modification is to restrict the loss function to be 
linear in time. In other words, loss will be equal to 1 = gT there g 
is a positive constant (dollars lost per unit of time) and T, as before, 
is the total length of time the fire bums, (En^irical work on the nature 
of this loss function has been sparse and inconclusive, and has focused 
mainly on response distance as the explanatory variable [20]. However, 
there is weak evidence that loss is in fact a linear function of response 
time [20].) The expected value of T is simply the sum of mean detection 
19 
and reporting time, mean queuing time, mean travel time, and mean service 
time. 
Risk neutral utility functions have the unique property of having 
the utility of the expected value of wealth equal to the expected value 
of the utility of wealth [18, p. 49]. Linear loss functions are such 
that the loss associated with the expected value of T is equal to the 
expected value of loss. In equation form, 
E[U(Z)] = U[E(Z)] 
and 
E[L(T)] = L[E(T)] . 
These two restrictions allow one to focus exclusively on the expected 
values of all variables. Thus, instead of having to employ whole density 
functions, only the means of density functions need be used. This 
simplification will make the analysis considerably more manageable. 
The third restriction is the assumption that all individuals in a 
district have the same amount of wealth. This assunçtion will simplify 
a portion of the conçarative statics of the model. If Tiebout [34] 
is to be believed, this assumption may be an approximation of what 
frequently occurs in the real world anyway. 
Choosing S and N for Each Level of Per-Person Cost 
As before, detection and reporting time as well as service time are 
assumed to be exogenous to the model. The concerns here, then, are the 
effects on the expected value of queuing time (W^) and on the expected 
value of travel time to the median individuals (TT) of changing the 
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district's configuration. In other words, how do W and TT change as S 
q 
and N change, given S/N? 
As mentioned in Chapter II, a characteristic of mean queuing time 
is that it declines as S and N increase proportionately. Doubling both 
the number of fire companies and the number of people in the district 
will cause W to decline. Of course, the larger S/N is, the smaller W 
9 q 
is for any particular N. These ideas are illustrated in Figure 4. 
W 
N 
Figure 4. Expected queuing time 
•What Figure 4 implies is that the queuing time conponent of T can be 
reduced simply by increasing the size of the district, S/N constant. 
However, increasing district size will also increase travel distance to 
the median individuals' residences (please see Appendix B). This 
additional travel distance translates into additional time, as described 
below. 
21 
The simplest relationship to postulate between travel time (TT) and 
distance (D) is TT = D/V vhere V is the average velocity of the fire 
trucks. However, a more sophisticated relationship has been developed by 
Kolesar et [22] and tested in New York City. Their model attempts 
to account for the time needed for the trucks to accelerate as well as 
for the effects of deceleration xdien the trucks leave the main roads 
as the destination is approached. With this in mind, the following 
equations were constructed: 
TT = 2(D/a)l/2 if D < 2d, and 
TT = Vc/a + D/Vc if D > 2d 
where a is the rate of acceleration, Vc is the cruising velocity of the 
vehicles, and d is the distance required to achieve cruising velocity. 
Since the model as presented contains three different units of measure, 
it is necessary to convert all travel times into minutes as follows: 
TT = 2 — if D < 2d, and 
a — 
TT = Vc/a + 1^ if D > 2d . 
Estimates of the model's parameters were obtained by Kolesar et al. 
[22] for New York City. The rate of acceleration was found to be 
29.0 miles/hour/minute, cruising velocity was 39.2 miles/hour, and the 
distance required to achieve cruising velocity was .44 miles. They also 
found that travel times were virtually the same at night as during the 
day and that the peak rush hour increased travel time by a maximum of 20%. 
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With this travel time model and the method of relating median travel 
distance to population presented in Appendix B, it is possible to 
establish a relationship between travel time to the median individuals' 
residences and district population. Since the area of a district grows 
more rapidly than median distance, this relationship is of the form 
shown in Figure 5. 
Time 
TT 
0 
Figure 5, Expected travel time to the median individuals 
In other words, TT increases as N increases, but at a decreasing rate. 
Let expected response time to the median individuals' residences (KE) 
be defined as the sum of and TT. By so doing, it is possible to 
determine the district size that minimizes KE for a given S/N. The idea 
is demonstrated in Figure 6. 
* 
N represents the equilibrium population size for a district with 
a given S/N, since it minimizes the expected response time to the median 
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Time 
RI = TT + W 
TT 
W (— constant) 
N* 0 N 
Figure 6. Minimi zing RT 
* 
individuals* residences. With S/N given, determining N also determines 
s . Returning to Figure 1 in Chapter II, one can plot S and N as in 
Figure 7. 
S 
S/N 
* 
S 
N* N 
Figure 7. Plotting S and N 
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Note, however, that S can only take on integer values. With the 
makeup of fire companies exogenously determined, one can have one fire 
company or two fire companies, but not one and a half fire conçanies. 
* 
As a result, N can take on only values tSiich are integer multiples of 
the N in the given S/N. Suppose, for example, that S/N = 1/15,000. If 
s equals 2, N must equal 30,000. If S equals 3, N must equal 45,000. 
tfc yir 
s can never equal 2.5, so N can never equal 37,500. This phenomenon 
is important to keep in mind •tdien considering the comparative statics of 
the model (see below), since it imparts a certain "lunçiness" to the 
model. 
This model can be used to predict how changes in various parameters 
will affect the equilibrium district size for each level of per-person 
cost. For example, an increase in the frequency of alarms (due either to 
an increase in the number of fires or in the number of false alarms) will 
cause the fire companies to be busy more often. This will cause the 
* 
queuing function to shift out, increasing N as illustrated in Figure 8. 
Intuitively, as queuing time becomes a larger component of response time, 
the reductions in due to increases in N (S/N constant) outweigh the 
increases in TT over a larger range of N. Therefore, the minimum point on 
the response time function is shifted rightward, and the equilibrium size 
of the district increases. A decrease in the frequency of alarms has the 
opposite effect. The complexity of the queuing time equation (see 
Appendix A) precludes an analytic proof of these results, but they 
consistently occur in simulations of the model as reported in Appendix D. 
The simulations also illustrate the "integers probleirf' alluded to above: 
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Time 
KT 
RT 
TT 
0 
Figure 8. An increase in alarm frequencies 
Since S and N can change only by discrete amounts, under some 
circumstances, a change in alarm frequencies will not be large enough 
to alter S or N . There is, in essence, a "threshold effect", which 
indicates that minor changes in the parameters will not always alter the 
location of the equilibrium. 
A decrease in service time reduces the time that a unit is busy and 
* 
hence shifts the queuing function down. N will therefore tend to 
* 
decrease. Analogously, an increase in service time will increase N . 
These conclusions are likewise supported by the simulations in Appendix D 
and are subject to the same threshold effect. 
An increase in population density decreases travel time to the Nth 
* 
person's residence. All else equal, this increases N , since reductions 
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in W will be larger than increases in TT over a larger range of N. 
q 
However, less time spent traveling means that units will be available for 
new assignments sooner, thereby reducing queuing times. This effect tends 
to decrease N . The net effect on N depends upon the relative sizes of 
the counteracting tendencies. The impact on travel time of a change in 
population density is: 
ÔTT ÔD 
ÔD • ÔA 
where A represents density. The impact on queuing time is 
dTT ^ 
ÔTT 3D ÔA 
where is the mean blocking rate.^ Once again, however, the expression 
for is intractable, so cannot be obtained. The simulations 
indicate that in general, an increase in population density tends to 
* 
increase N for a given S/N, but again the threshold effect is operative. 
The Expansion Path 
* * 
As before, calculating S and N for each S/N allows one to define 
an expansion path. For club goods in general, the shape of the expansion 
blocking time is the interval between the moment one customer begins 
service and the moment the next customer can be served. In the case of 
queues in a grocery store, blocking time and service time (see Appendix A) 
are the same. However, in situations such as fire service, blocking time 
is equal to service time plus travel time between fires. This paper 
follows Alec Lee's advice that when appropriate, queuing models should use 
blocking time instead of service time [23, p. 13]. 'With respect to the 
question at hand, changes in travel time directly affect blocking time and 
therefore, queuing time. A failure to distinguish between service time 
and blocking time would be to overlook this point. 
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path is indeterminate. Adams [1, 2] has shown that although goods per 
person increases along the expansion path, the size of the club (in terms 
of S and N ) may either rise or fall as S/N increases. However, the 
simulations presented in Appendix D indicate that for fire suppression 
services, S and N both decrease as S/N increases, as shown in Figure 9. 
The stepwise shape of the expansion path results from the aforementioned 
integers problem. The reduction of district size as the quality of 
service increases is intuitively reasonable, because as S/N increases, 
queuing time becomes less and less important. Hence, the reductions in 
S 
(v) / W / W 
5 
4 
Expansion path 
3 
2 
1 
N 
Figure 9. The expansion path 
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expected queuing time from increasing S and N proportionately will be 
offset more quickly by the increases in travel time caused by increasing N. 
The same factors that were previously shown to affect the location 
* 
of N for each S/N value affect the location of the entire expansion path 
in exactly the same fashion. For example, an increase in the frequency 
of alarms increases N and S for each S/N value and causes the expansion 
path to shift "up" toward larger-sized districts. 
Choosing the Equilibrium S/N 
Given the club configurations available as presented by the 
expansion path, each voter will desire the S/N which maximizes his 
expected utility. Recall that in this chapter utility is defined as 
being equal to wealth, i.e. U = Z. Hence, E(U) = E(Z). Wealth net of 
dues is again designated by and is the value of wealth if there is no 
fire. In the event that there is a fire, wealth will be equal to 
Zjj - L, T^ere L = gT as defined previously. With being the probability 
of a fire occurring, expected utility is: 
E(U) = (1 - Pj.) (Zjj) + P^(Z^ - gT) . 
Higher levels of S/N increase expected utility by reducing expected 
response time, but decrease expected utility by increasing dues and 
therefore, reducing Z^. For any particular individual, the utility 
maximizing S/N occurs where the gains from decreasing T are just offset by 
the losses associated with higher dues. The utility maximizing S/N of the 
individual with the median preference will be the equilibrium S/N, 
designated (S/N) . This individual need not live the median distance 
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away from the center of the equilibrium district. However, for 
simplicity, the simulations assume that he does. 
* 
There are several factors that will affect the location of (S/N) . 
An increase in the cost of fire conç>anies, for example, increases dues 
* 
for each S/N. All else equal, this will lead to a lower (S/N) because 
the reduced expected losses from having a higher S/N are more quickly 
outweighed by the extra expense. Note, however, that the location of 
the expansion path itself is unaffected if the price of fire companies 
is independent of the quantity a district purchases [1, 2], Again, 
simulation results support this conclusion and shed light on some other 
points as well. For example, as the frequency of alarms declines, the 
* 
choice of (S/N) becomes more sensitive to changes in the cost of fire 
companies. As standard economic theory predicts, the less necessary a 
good becomes, the more elastic will be the demand for that good. The 
simulations also show a mild trend supporting the idea that a 
technological improvement that reduces service time will reduce (S/N) . 
This would occur for two reasons: First, a reduction in service time 
reduces queuing time, shifting the expansion path "down". Response time 
for each S/N will decline, -vAiich means that a lower S/N is needed to 
maintain the same service level. Secondly, the service time conçonent of 
T declines, reducing loss in the event that there is a fire. Lower 
response times would, therefore, not be quite as important as they were 
previously. The simulations also indicate that, all else equal, a 
* 
decrease in population density will tend to increase (S/N) . 
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With a risk neutral utility function, the marginal utility of wealth 
is constant. Therefore, the effect of an increase in wealth will manifest 
itself only in an increase in the slope of the loss function. (This is 
assuming that wealthier individuals have both more expensive and more 
numerous possessions. Hence, the wealthier an individual is, the more 
damage the fire will do in a given amount of time.) A reduction in 
"k 
expected response time is therefore worth more, and (S/N) will increase 
as wealth increases. This result is also supported by our simulations. 
The universal adoption of smoke or heat sensors would reduce fire 
detection and reporting time. This would reduce the expected value of 
T, and hence, reduce expected loss in the event of a fire. All else 
* 
equal, this would tend to reduce (S/N) . 
Fire Insurance and Rent Gradients 
Until now, the possibility of purchasing fire insurance has been 
ignored. For risk neutral individuals, this is of no concern, since 
they wouldn't buy insurance even if it were available. This is because 
insurance companies need to charge a premium in excess of the expected 
value of loss in order to cover operating expenses and to make a profit. 
The expected value of loss is Pp(gT), so the premium (R) must be greater 
than Pp(gT). The expected utility of a risk neutral individual without 
insurance is 
E(U) = (1 - Pp)Z^ + Pp(Z^ - gT) . 
The expected utility of a risk neutral individual with insurance that 
promises to pay the value of the loss in the event of a fire is 
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E(U) = (1 - Pp)Z^ + Pp(Zjj - gT) + Pp(gT) - R . 
Since it has already been established that R > Pp(gT), the individual is 
clearly better off without the insurance. 
In the general model where risk aversion is possible, fire insurance 
becomes a legitimate concern. In that situation, insurance becomes 
somewhat of a substitute for fire suppression services. It is probable 
that individuals will desire both insurance and fire suppression services 
up to the point where the ratios of their marginal expected utility to 
their marginal cost are equal. In addition, individuals who, due to the 
voting rules, do not get their utility maximizing S/N (or S and N given 
S/N) may use insurance as a means of adjusting. People tdio get worse 
fire protection than they want may buy more insurance than they might 
have with better protection, and vice versa. In addition, it should be 
pointed out that insurance companies link their insurance rates to the 
quality of fire suppression services in an area. Thus, individuals have 
an extra incentive to demand a hi^ier S/N since it will also reduce their 
insurance rates. 
It is also worth noting that with equal dues and a homogeneous 
population (having the same wealth and utility functions), a rent gradient 
will probably be established. Since response time to the edge of the 
district exceeds response time nearer to the center, expected loss is 
greater at the edge. All else equal, individuals will be better off 
living nearer to the center, so rents will be bid up there until rent 
differentials reflect the advantages of living nearer to the fire station. 
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CHAPTER IV. MAN-MADE RECREATIONAL FACILITIES 
This chapter vill extend the analysis of the preceding chapters to 
consider its application to man-made recreational facilities such as 
tennis courts. While the situations are similar in many respects, there 
are two significant differences between the emergency service and the 
recreational facilities problems. The first is that in the former case, 
the service is brought to the individual, while in the latter situation, 
the individual travels to the facility. Secondly (and more importantly), 
it was assumed that everyone had a potential need for a fire suppression 
service (i.e., everyone had a positive probability of having a fire). 
However, some individuals may never play tennis. Any model dealing with 
the provision of recreational facilities must therefore take this 
diversity of preferences into account. 
In this chapter, the same decision-making framework as was used in 
the prior chapters will be employed. Let S be the number of tennis 
courts and N be the number of people in a district. Then the choice of 
S and N given S/N will be such that the utility of the persons living 
the median distance from the courts will be greater than utility of 
individuals living the median distance from the courts in any other sized 
district. Given the district configuration for each S/N, the individual 
with the median preference will ultimately decide on a particular S/N. 
The Utility Function 
The utility function used in this chapter will be of the form 
U = U(Y, H, G) 
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where Y represents expenditxires on all goods except those associated with 
H, "(Aiich stands for the nimiber of sessions the individual spends playing 
tennis, G represents all remaining leisure time. The individual earns 
income by working at a job ^Aiich pays w dollars per hour. 
To make the problem manageable, it will be assumed that the utility 
function is risk neutral with respect to the relevant variables. As will 
become apparent later on, these variables include the "price" of H, and 
hence, reference to an indirect utility function is necessary to determine 
risk neutrality. Appendix E discusses this process and is included for 
the reader's convenience. As before, the assumption of risk neutrality 
allows us to focus exclusively on the expected values of all variables. 
The Elements of the Problem 
As before, there is a one-to-one correspondence between per-person 
cost and the ratio of courts to people (S/N), Let P be the (annualized) 
cost of each tennis court, Per-person cost (dues) can then be defined 
as (PS)/N. If P is independent of S, dues are linearly related to S/N. 
It will be useful later on to have dues expressed on a daily basis, so 
let us define P = P/365, so dues will be equal to 
This "tennis tsx^ is a lump-sum tax that must be paid whether or not the 
individual uses the tennis courts. If the courts are used, then the 
individual incurs certain costs per trip, both in terms of time and money. 
Time costs include queuing time, round-trip travel time, and the time 
needed to.play a session of tennis. Let the expected value of these 
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variables be designated as TT, and X, respectively. Monetary cost 
is the round-trip transportation cost equal to eT^ •sAere e is the cost 
per mile and T^ is the distance in miles to and from the courts. 
If we monetize the time costs by multiplying them by w, the 
opportunity cost of time, we can determine the expected value of the cost 
of one trip to the tennis courts. Let us designate this as the expected 
price of good H (Pg), and 
Pg = (W^ + TT + X)w + eTjj . 
The value of X is completely up to the individual, and is assumed to be 
independent of district size. However, the configuration of the district 
will influence the values of TT, and T^. 
Choosing S and N for Each Level of Per-Person Cost 
As noted above, a given level of per-person cost (dues) implies a 
given S/N. To determine the equilibrium sized district for a particular 
S/N, it is necessary to select S and N so that P is minimized for those 
individuals living the median distance from the center of the district. 
Once again, declines as S and N increase, S/N constant, but T^ and TT 
for the median individuals increase as N increases. P is therefore 
minimized for persons living the median distance from the center when 
S and N are such that (W^ + TT)w + eT^ is minimized, as pictured in 
Figure 10. (Recall that X is independent of S and N.) TT w may be less 
than or greater than eT^, depending on the values of w and e. The values 
of TT and displ^ed on the graph are those for the individual who 
would live the median distance from the courts. 
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(W +TT)w + eT. 
W «v 
0 
Figure 10. Minimizing for the median person 
^ * 
Given S/N, determining N automatically determines S , as was 
demonstrated in Figure 7. 
While no simulations have been run on this model, it is likely that 
the comparative statistics of it are similar to those of the risk neutral 
fire suppression model. For example, a general increase in the frequency 
* 
that people play tennis will cause W^*w to shift up, increasing N . An 
increase in X would have the same effect, as the longer people stay on 
the courts, the longer others will have to wait for a court to become 
available, all else equal. 
'k * 
Changes in e and w will also affect the location of N and S . If 
the price of gasoline, for example, were to increase, eT^ would shift up. 
This would make travel distance more significant than previously, probably 
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^ 
reducing N . An increase in w will shift both TT«v and up, with 
the net effect being ambiguous without resorting to simulations. 
Utility Maximization and the Equilibrium S/N 
* 
As before, an expansion path can be obtained by determining S and 
* 
N for each level of S/N. Given these configurations, each individual 
will desire the S/N that maximizes his utility. 
For a particular S/N, dues and P will be known. The utility level 
for a given S/N can, therefore, be determined by maximizing 
U = U(Y, H, G) 
subject to the constraint that 
24w = Py Y + [ 4- TT + X)w + e]^]S + wG + M 
or 
24w = Py Y + Pg H + wG + M . 
This constraint simply says that the individual's expenditures of 
money and (monetized) expenditures of time cannot exceed their maximum. 
24w represents the individual's maximum potential income. P^ is the 
price of "good" Y. Since Y is essentially an income variable, from now 
on P will be defined as being equal to one. As discussed previously, P 
y E 
is the cost per trip to the tennis courts. G is multiplied by w so as 
to reflect the opportunity cost of leisure. M represents the mandatory 
lump sum tennis tax (dues) associated with the particular S/N. 
We are now in a position to set up a Lagrangian, L, in order to 
solve the utility maximizing problem: 
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L = U(Y, H, G) + X(24w - Y - - wG - M) . 
The first order conditions for utility maximization are; 
ÔL/ÔY = ÔU/ÔÏ - X = 0 
ÔL/ÔH = ÔU/ÔH - XP„ = 0 
ôL/ôG = ÔU/ÔG - Xw = 0 
ÔL/ÔX = 24w - Y - PjjW - wG - M . 
The usual conditions for a utility maximum hold here as well. The ratios 
of any two marginal utilities are equal to the price ratios of the two 
goods in question. What makes this problem unusual is that by choosing 
a different S/N, the individual is able to alter the constraint in his 
utility maximizing problem. A different S/N means both a different M 
and a different P_, since W , TT, and T-, will change. The exposition of 
n q U 
this point can be facilitated by means of graphs. (The problem cannot 
be solved by fully differentiating the first order conditions because 
P contains W as an element. As noted previously, W is 
H q q 
undifferentiable.) 
Consider a particular S/N with its associated M and P . The 
individual's budget plane would be as depicted in Figure 11. 
The intercept on each axis is obtained by solving the constraint in 
the utility maximization problem with other variables equal to zero. 
For example, to obtain the intercept on the G axis, set Y = H = 0 and 
solve for G: 
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Figure 11. The budget plane 
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24w = Y + PgE + wG + M 
24w = wG + M 
or 
24w - M G = 
w 
Let us now consider the effect of increasing (S/N) to (S/N)'. First 
of all, this will cause dues to rise from M to M'. The intercepts on 
the Y and G axes will unequivocally move in towards the origin. It 
will also tend to cause the intercept on the H axis to shift in, but the 
increase in S/N will cause W , TT, and T_ to decline^, decreasing Î . 
g D H 
Thus, the net effect on the fraction 
24w - M 
% 
is indeterminate. However, as we shall see, the only relevant case is 
when the decrease in the denominator overwhelms the decrease in the 
numerator, causing the intercept on the H axis to shift out as pictured 
in Figure 12. 
If the decrease in the numerator caused by the increase in M 
ovenàielms the decrease in the denominator caused by the decline in P 
(via the decrease in TT, and T^), then the new budget plane will lie 
everywhere inside of the old budget plane, clearly making the individual 
worse off. This can be said without reference to a utility function 
because the increase in dues is greater than the savings in terms of the 
provided we are moving along the expansion path. 
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Figure 12, Shifting the budget plane 
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lower cost of traveling to the tennis court even if the individual made 
the maximum number of trips to the court possible. This situation is 
likely to occur when S/N is already relatively large. In such a case, 
P is relatively small, and any reductions in P would also be small. 
This reduction would be less than the increase in dues, ôM/â(S/N) = Pg. 
The situation is graphically represented in Figure 13, 
Returning now to the case where increasing S/N causes the H intercept 
to shift out, the question of utility maximization still remains. 
Indifference surfaces in Y-H-G space can be obtained by taking the total 
differential of the utility function and setting it equal to zero as 
follows : 
U = U(Y, H, G) 
so 
du = |2dy + ^ dH + ^ dG = o . 
The location of these indifference surfaces are fixed. Thus, 
changing S/N shifts the budget plane, but not the indifference surfaces. 
The utility maximizing individual will therefore choose the S/N that is 
associated with the budget plane that allows him or her to reach the 
highest possible indifference surface. The utility maximum may be a 
* 
point such as U in Figure 14. 
Selecting a different S/N means shifting the budget plane and 
* 
obtaining a tangency on a different indifference surface. If U is the 
utility maximum, then all other values of S/N result in budget planes 
tangent to lower and indifference surfaces. Mathematically, solving for 
TJ involves finding the point where 
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Figure 13. An inferior new budget plane 
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Figure 14. Utility maximization 
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du au 3Y au SH au SG ^ 
d(s/N) ~ aY a(s/N) an 3(S/n) ac a(s/N) ~ " • 
Once again, no analytic solution to this problem is possible because the 
queuing time equation is intractable. 
It is completely possible that, for non-tennis players in particular, 
the utility maximizing S/N = 0. In other words, some people would prefer 
having no tennis courts and therefore, no dues, as in Figure 15. 
It should also be noted that the utility maximizing S/N can be 
different for two individuals having identical utility functions. This 
is because they may live in different locations, and hence, TT and 
will differ. Thus, the equilibrium sized district for any particular 
S/N will result in different budget planes for each person. Consider, 
* * 
for example, a particular S/N with its associated equilibrium S and N . 
Individual A lives close to the center of an equilibrium district, •vdxile 
individual B lives near the edge of the district. Although A and B are 
identical in all other respects (not only having identical utility 
functions, but also the same X, e and w), TT and T^ will be larger for 
B than for A. Thus, Pg will be larger for B than for A, •viiich is 
reflected in different budget planes as illustrated in Figure 16. With 
A and B having different budget planes, it is not likely that they will 
have the same utility maximizing S/N. 
Returning to the larger story, each person will vote for the S/N 
which maximizes his utility, and the voter with the median preference will 
dominate. This final result determines the number of "tennis districts" 
to create, the number of people in each district, and the number of 
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Figure 15. 
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U for a non-tennis player 
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Figure 16, Vocational differences illustrated 
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courts to build in each district. Suppose, for example, that the 
* * 
equilibrium S/N, (S/N) , is 1/20,000, and is associated with S = 2 
and N* = 40,000. If the city's population is 200,000 people, there will 
be 5 districts (200,000/40,000), with 2 courts and 40,000 people in each 
district. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has explained vdiy and given examples of how 
spatial and temporal considerations might be integrated into the economic 
theory of clubs. Space and time are important elements in determining 
the quality of club service, and a failure to incorporate them has been 
a serious deficiency in formal club theory. 
A model of fire suppression districts has been constructed \diich 
shows how equilibrium districts are determined under a particular 
decision-making framework. Items that affect the location of the 
equilibrium have also been discussed. Simulations of the restricted model 
were presented %Aiich supported the arguments in the text. Space, which 
requires time to move through, and time variables are central to the 
model. This is because time is a crucial variable ^ flien an emergency 
such as a fire occurs. 
In the tennis court example, there are no longer any emergencies, 
but the model reflects the fact that time itself is a scarce resource. 
As such, time has an opportunity cost vAiich must be considered. Space 
enters the model because it requires the expenditure of both time and 
other resources (reflected by monetary costs) to move through. 
The models used in this dissertation are not offered as definitive 
efforts, but rather as prototypes upon vhich further analysis can be 
based. Possible extensions include incorporating more location theory, 
employing more sophisticated operations research techniques, allowing 
for different financing schemes and altering the decision-making 
framework. The models might also serve as the basis of empirical work. 
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APPENDIX A: QUEUING THEORY 
Introduction 
Queuing theory is the application of mathematical and statistical 
techniques to problems associated with "queues" or waiting lines. It was 
originally developed in response to the needs of business and industry, 
where queuing problems are quite common. 
Consider, for example, the predicament of the manager of a busy 
supermarket. If he hires too few clerks, the length of the check-out 
lines m^ become intolerably long, ultimately resulting in a loss of 
customers. On the other hand, if he hires too many clerks, he will find 
that he is paying them to stand around idle for most of the day. 
Determining the optimal number of clerks to hire is a classic queuing 
theory problem. 
The Structure of the Queuing Process 
The queuing process begins \Aien a "customer" (not necessarily human) 
arrives at the queuing system and requires service. If all available 
servers are occupied, a line forms. Eventually, the customer is served 
and then leaves the system. 
More formally, customers are generated from an "input source" or 
population. This population may be classified as either finite or 
infinite, though in practice any finite but "large" population may be 
treated as infinite [26, p. 9], The pattern in •rfiich members of the 
population arrive is typically, thougjh not always, assxmed to follow a 
Poisson distribution. Exançles of customers arriving at a queuing system 
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include people lining up at a bank teller's window, ships arriving at a 
port to tinload their cargo, papers being placed on a typist's desk, and 
phone calls for help arriving at a fire station. 
If all available servers are busy when the customers arrive, a queue 
forms. In some cases, the length of the queue itself is limited, perhaps 
by the size of the "waiting room". But even when the queue has no such 
limitations, it is possible that the customer may choose not to enter 
the queuing system if the line is too long. Such behavior is referred to 
as "balking". 
The order in which customers leave the queue to be served is known 
as the queue discipline. The most common type is "first-in-first-out" or 
FIFO discipline. Other types include "last-in-first-out" (LIFO), "served 
in random order" (SIRO), and variations of these •which incorporate a 
priority procedure. An example of this last type can be found at a 
hospital emergency room where critically injured patients are treated 
ahead of less seriously ill people who have been waiting longer. 
The queuing system may possess one or more servers. It is these 
individuals (or machines) who perform the task(s) that the customer 
requires. The time that it takes to accomplish this task is called the 
service time. If the service time is virtually identical for every 
customer, one may speak of a constant service time distribution. However, 
the length of the service time frequently varies with each customer. 
Hence, it becomes necessary to specify probability distributions for 
service times. The most common is the exponential distribution, but the 
Erlang (gamma) distribution is also frequently appropriate. 
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A Basic Model 
Modeling a real-world queuing process must begin by collecting 
information about the system in question. One must determine the size of 
the population, the nature of the arrival pattern, the maximum queue 
length, queue discipline, the number of servers, and the distribution of 
service times. For the sake of illustration, let us assume that we are 
examining a fairly standard queuing system with the following 
characteristics : 
1) The population is large enough that the rate of arrival may be 
treated as being independent of the number of people in the 
system. 
2) The arrival pattern of new customers follows a Poisson 
distribution with mean X. (X is, therefore, the mean arrival 
rate per unit of time.) 
3) Arrivals form a single queue which has no upper bound. There is 
no balking. 
4) Customers are served in order of arrival. (FIFO queue 
discipline.) 
5) There are s servers. 
6) The service time distribution is exponential with mean p,. Hence, 
l/|i is the expected service time. 
7) The utilization factor p is defined as X/(s^). p must be less 
than one, since if p > 1, the queue will become infinitely large, 
(p > 1 implies X > sp,. In such a situation, customers arrive 
faster than the system can process them.) 
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With such information, queuing theory allows one to calculate various 
steady-state characteristics of the system. For this particular model, 
the formulae needed to obtain most of the important characteristics have 
been derived and are readily available. Some of these are reproduced 
below [19, pp. 421-422]. 
1) The probability that there are no customers in the system is: 
P. = 
s-1 . fX/u) 1 
Z N: + s: l-(X/(s|j,)) 
N=0 
2) The expected length of the queue is: 
PQ(X/P)®P 
3) The expected waiting time in the queue (net of service time) is; 
4) The expected waiting time in the system (gross of service time) 
is: 
W = W + — . 
q p, 
5) The probability distribution of waiting times is: 
When s-l-X/p = 0, this becomes 
s:(i-p) 
-u,t F (X/p,) = 
P(W) > t) = e 1 + ?... pt . 
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Similar results are available for other types of queuing models. 
However, there is a large group of queuing models for vhich either no 
general solutions have been found, or the solutions obtained are so 
intractable as to be virtually useless for practical applications. As a 
result, Monte Carlo simulations are frequently employed as a means of 
estimating the characteristics of queuing systems. Such simulations are 
especially important when: 
1) The queue discipline is not FIFO, 
2) The arrival pattern is not Poisson, or 
3) The service time distribution is not constant, exponential or 
Erlang. 
It should be emphasized that the above formulae apply to queuing 
systems in a steady state. This is due primarily to \ihat Alec Lee called 
"the first working rule of queuing theory", namely, "time dependent 
solutions to queuing models are either unobtainable or unmanageable" [23, 
p. 26]. Nevertheless, one must recognize the fact that many queuing 
systems may never reach a steady state, or if they do, may not stay there 
long. But even in such circumstances, queuing models may provide some 
insight into the system. As Lee points out, 
"It is possible for an engineer to make a great deal of 
practical progress by using formulas for the properties of gases 
derived from the models of statistical mechanics (v&ich also 
assume steady-state conditions). Similarly, the operational 
research practitioner can make much headway by using steady-state 
formulas" [23, pp. 215-126]. 
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APPENDIX B: DETERMINING MEDIAN DISTANCE 
Consider a square, diamond-shaped district such as the one depicted 
below in Figure Bl. 
Figure Bl. A fire suppression district 
Distance r is the shortest distance from the center of the diamond 
to its perimeter. (This distance on any diamond will henceforth be called 
its "short radius". ) Basic geometry allows us to describe the length of 
one side of the diamond as being equal to r + r = 2r, The Pythagorean 
theorem allows us to determine the distance from the center of the diamond 
to a comer as being equal to r. 
With the length of one side of the diamond being equal to 2r, the 
2 2 
area of the diamond is (2r) = 4r . If population density is (uniformly) 
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equal to A, then the total number of people in the district is equal to 
2 à k T .  
Consider another diamond with Z being the short radius, and Z < r, 
as shown in Figure B2. 
Figure B2, Concentric diamond Z 
The perimeter of such a diamond is 8Z. The number of people living 
along the perimeter of this diamond is A8Z. 
If we allow Z to vary from o to r, and then sum up the total number 
of people, we get 
r 
I A8Z dZ = Mr^ 
o 
xAich is the total number of people in the original diamond, as already 
demonstrated. 
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The percentage of the total population living on the perimeter of 
any particular diamond is 
A8Z 2Z 
2 (2Z)/r is the density function of population. From it we can obtain 
both the mean and the median distances. 
Recall that the mean of any variable X is 
E(X) = J Xf(X)dX 
•where f(X) is the density function of X. Thus, the mean distance is 
r 2z 
E(Z) = J Z ^  dZ = 2/3 r . 
o r 
The median, m, is obtained by solving for m xdiere 
J dZ = 1/2 
o r 
inçlying that m = —^ r. Median distance is, therefore, greater than 
mean distance, since l/«/Y > 2/3. 
Note that along a road grid, the distance to every point on the 
perimeter of a diamond from the center is the same. Consider, for exançle, 
the diamond \âiich has distance m for its short radius, as shown in 
Figure B3. 
Let the road grid run north-south and east-west. Distance m becomes 
distance 2e along the grid. (Note that vT m, the distance to the far 
comer, is also equal to 2e along the road grid.) So: 
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Figure B3. Distance along a road grid 
2 2 2 
m = e + e 
or 
and 
e = m 
2e = 2m 
l^î 
Recall that m = r, so 
Jl 
Travel distance along a road grid to the perimeter of a diamond xdiich 
contains half of the district's population is therefore equal to the 
short radius of the entire district. 
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APPENDIX C: OBTAINING THE DENSITY FUNCTION OF A RANDOM 
VARIABLE WHICH IS EQUAL TO THE SIM OF OTHER 
RANDOM VARIABLES 
Let Y, X, and Z be random variables such that Y = X+ Z. If X and 
Z are independent, the density function of Y may be obtained from the 
density functions of X and Z^. 
To illustrate the procedure, consider the following case, where X 
is distributed uniformly (a, b), and Z is distributed exponentially (X). 
The density functions are therefore 
f (X) = • ^ a < X < b 
X b - a — — 
and 
fgCZ) = Xe'^Z Z > 0 . 
If X and Z are independent, then 
= f^(X).f^(Z) . 
The distribution function of Y is 
Fy(t) = P(Y < t) 
and 
P(Y < t) = P(X + Z < t) . 
From this information one can obtain the density function of Y, 
•vAiich comes in two parts: 
^The density function of Y can be obtained even if X and Z are not 
independent, but the process is much more complicated. 
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Part I: a < t ^  b 
t t-x 
P(X + Z < t) = r r f (X,Z)dZdX 
a o 
To obtain the density function of Y %bere a < t < b, one must take the 
derivative of the above distribution function with respect to t, tAiich 
results in the expression 
b^ (1 - + ^ 5 . 
Part II: b < t 
b t-x 
P(X + Z < t) = J J f^ ^ (X,Z)dZdX 
a o * 
b t-x 
= ; I bTT: >52 •K = ^  [b - a + 
a o 
1 , "Xt + Xa —Xt + Xb. 1 
Y - e ) J . 
Taking the derivative with respect to t results in 
1 ,_"Xt + Xb -Xt + Xsl 
b - a ® • 
Hence, 
= (e'^t + Xb _ ^-Xt + Xa^ t > b . 
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It should be noted that the procedure can be extended to the more 
general case where 
N 
Y = S X. . 
i=l ^ 
With respect to obtaining the density function for T, recall that 
N 
T = S X. 
i=l ^ 
where X^ = detection and reporting time, 
X2 = queuing time, 
= travel time, and 
X^ = service time. 
In the basic queuing model of Appendix A, service time is assumed to 
have an exponential distribution. The density function of queuing time 
can be derived from the fact that 
P(W > t) = (1 - S P ) 
H=0 
where P^ is the probability that there are exactly N people in the queue 
at any time t [19, p. 422], 
The distribution function of W is therefore 
q 
p(w < t) = 1 - P(W > t) 
q - q 
= 1 - (1 - 2 P_) ^ 
N=0 ^ 
Hence, the density function of is 
d[p(¥ < t)] s-1 „ 
^ = s|i(l-p) (1-2 p ) e-sp(l-p)t t > 0 . 
N=0 
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The distributions of travel time and detection and reporting time 
might be hypothesized as having either truncated normal or uniform 
distributions. The exact form must, of course, be empirically verified. 
Obtaining the actual density function of T would involve specifying 
the exact density functions of all four component variables, and then 
solving the necessary quadruple integrals. 
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APPENDIX D: SIMOLAIION RESULTS 
The results of calculating values for S and (S/N) under various 
situations are presented in the accompanying table. The key to that 
table is as follows: 
K represents the population size required to generate one fire alarm 
per hour. Thus, the larger K is, the smaller the frequency of alarms for 
any given sized population. The numbers chosen for K stem from a chart 
presented on page 8 of Chaiken and Larson [6]. In 1968, at peak time on 
the highest alarm day, there were 111 alarms per hour in New York City. 
The population of New York City in 1970 was 7,894,851 [36]. Dividing 
that population by 111 produces the number 71,125, representing K at 
peak time on a peak day. According to the same chart, peak time on an 
average day generated 48 alarms per hour, resulting in K equal to 164,476. 
K equal to 263,162 represents peak time on the lowest alarm day of the 
year, •vâien 30 alarms per hour were reported. 
Ug represents mean service rate, i.e. the number of fires which a 
fire company can extinguish per hour, = 2 implies service time 
averages 30 minutes per fire, = 3 implies a 20-minute average, and so 
on. Note that service time here includes both "set-up time" and "roll-up 
time" (i.e. the time needed to set-up the fire hoses, etc., as well as 
the time needed to roll them up again). 
"A" represents population density. In 1970, New York City had a 
population density of 26,345 people per square mile. The number 39,517 
was chosen because it is 50% greater than 26,345, or just slightly larger 
than the density of the Bronx (35,721 people per square mile in 1970). 
Table Dl, Simulation results 
* 
Values of S 
S/N 
K U. 
40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 
71,125 
164,476 
263,162 
2 39,517 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 
26,345 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 
13,172 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 
2,634 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 
3 39,517 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 
26,345 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 
13,172 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
2,634 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
4 39,517 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
26,345 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
13,172 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
2,634 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 39,517 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
26,345 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
13,172 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
2,634 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 39,517 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
26,345 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
13,172 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2,634 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
4 39,517 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
26,345 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
13,172 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
2,634 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
2 39,517 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
26,345 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
13,172 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2,634 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
J" 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
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Values of (S/N)* Values of (S/N)* 
(N is in thousands) (N is in thousands) 
WE 
C MB 
BR 
$50,000 $100,000 $150,000 
$500,000 $1,000,000 $1,500,000 37,500 75,000 112,500 
45,000 90,000 135,000 
1/5 1/10 1/15 1/15 1/10 1/5 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/15 1/10 1/5 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/5 
1/5 1/5 1/5 1/10 1/5 1/5 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/15 1/10 1/10 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/15 1/10 1/10 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/15 1/10 1/5 
1/5 1/5 1/10 1/10 1/5 1/5 
1/5 1/10 1/15 1/15 1/10 1/10 
1/5 1/10 1/15 1/15 1/10 1/10 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/15 1/10 1/5 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/5 
1/10 1/15 1/20 1/30 1/15 1/15 
1/10 1/15 1/20 1/25 1/15 1/15 
1/10 1/15 1/20 1/20 1/15 1/10 
1/5 1/10 1/15 1/15 1/10 1/10 
1/15 1/20 1/25 1/30 1/20 1/15 
1/10 1/20 1/25 1/30 1/20 1/15 
1/10 1/15 1/20 1/25 1/15 1/15 
1/5 1/10 1/15 1/15 1/10 1/5 
1/15 1/20 1/25 1/30 1/20 1/15 
1/10 1/20 1/25 1/30 1/20 1/15 
1/10 1/15 1/20 1/25 1/15 1/15 
1/5 1/10 1/10 1/15 1/10 1/10 
1/15 1/25 1/30 1/35 1/25 1/20 
1/15 1/25 1/30 1/35 1/25 1/20 
1/15 1/20 1/25 1/30 1/20 1/15 
1/10 1/15 1/20 1/20 1/15 1/10 
Table Dl. (Continued) 
* 
Values of S 
S/N S/N 
K U A 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 
3 39,517 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
26,345 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
13,172 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
2,634 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
4 39,517 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
26,345 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
13,172 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
2,634 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Values of (S/N)* Values of (S/N) 
(N is in thousands) (N is in thousands) 
WE 
C WB 
BR 
$50,000 $100,000 $150,000 
1 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,500,000 37,500 75,000 112,500 
5,000 45,000 90,000 135,000 
1 1/20 1/30 1/35 
1 1/15 1/25 1/35 
1 1/15 1/25 1/30 
1 1/10 1/15 1/15 
1 1/20 1/30 1/40 
1 1/15 1/30 1/35 
1 1/15 1/25 1/30 
1 1/10 1/15 1/15 
(Wealth held constant) 
wr = $100,000 
WB = 75,000 
BR = 90,000 
1/45 1/30 1/20 
1/40 1/25 1/20 
1/35 1/25 1/20 
1/20 1/15 1/10 
1/50 1/30 1/25 
1/45 1/30 1/20 
1/35 1/25 1/15 
1/20 1/15 1/10 
(Cost held constant) 
C = $1,000,000 
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The number 13,172 is one-half of 26,345, and 2634 is only 10% of 26,345, 
or roughly equal to the population density of Ames, Iowa (2,321 people 
per square mile in 1970). 
C represents the cost of maintaining one fire company for one year. 
Chaiken and Larson [6, p. 10] indicate that the cost of operating a 
single fire engine now frequently exceeds $500,000 per year, and many 
fire companies typically consist of two fire engines. 
WE represents the total wealth of the median individual. WB 
represents the portion of that wealth \diich would be jeopardized by a 
fire. BR is equivalent to the letter "g" in the text and is the rate at 
which fire will destroy wealth per hour. The values for BR are 
"guestimated" from page 23 of reference 20, where Ignall et present 
a ballpark figure of $1000 per minute of damage on a MB equal to $50,000. 
Hence, WB = $75,000 implies BR = $1,500 per minute or $90,000 per hour, 
etc. 
The table reveals several things. First, an expansion path is 
obtained by holding K, U^, and A constant viiile changing S/N. Larger 
* 
values of S/N tend to result in smaller values of S (and therefore, 
* * 
smaller N ). In some cases, S does not change due to the integers 
problem; nevertheless, a constant S does result in smaller N as S/N 
increases. To illustrate the point, consider the case where K = 71,125, 
Ug = 2, and A = 39,517. For S/N = 1/40,000, S =5, inçlying an 
N* = 200,000. For S/N = 1/10,000, S* = 2, implying an N* = 20,000. 
For S/N = 1/5,000, S still equals 2, but N will not only equal 10,000. 
73 
* 
Also, for a given S/N, S tends to decline as either K or 
increases or as A decreases. An increase in K or means that queuing 
time declines, so travel time becomes relatively more important. A 
decrease in A also means that travel time begins to dominate queuing 
considerations sooner, making for smaller districts in terms of both S 
and N. Again, however, the integers phenomenon continues with changes 
being discrete rather than continuous. 
As discussed in the text, the choice of the expected utility 
maximizing point along an expansion path [(S/N) ] is influenced by such 
things as cost, wealth, and the rate at which fire losses occur. The 
section of the table which is the second from the right examines the 
effect of changes in C under various conditions, holding HT, 1© and BR 
constant. Keeping the integers problem in mind, an increase in C causes 
* 
(S/N) to fall, illustrating the law of demand. For example, for 
K = 164,476, Ug = 2 and A = 39,517, (S/N)* goes from 1/10,000 to 1/15,000 
to 1/20,000 as C rises from $500,000 to $1,000,000 to $1,500,000. 
Furthermore, the effect seems to be more pronounced as K increases, 
implying that demand is more elastic as the frequency of alarms declines. 
Compare, for example, the case cited above to the situation where 
K = 263,162, keeping and A constant. Here, (S/N)* falls from 1/15,000 
to 1/25,000 as C rises from $500,000 to $1,000,000, indicating a greater 
sensitivity to cost. This result should be expected, since with lower 
alarm frequencies, the need for fire services is reduced, and it is 
well-known that the less necessary an item is, the more elastic will be 
the demand for that item. 
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In addition, for any given C, (S/N) tends to decline as K, U^, 
and/or A increase. The integers problem blurs this result, as an 
* 
increase in these parameters will not always reduce (S/N) . The effect 
of Ug is less pronounced than the effects of K and A, and there is one 
* 
example of an increase in actually increasing (S/N) (U^ changing from 
2 to 3 for C = $1,500,000, K = 71,125, and A = 39,517). Nevertheless, 
these trends exist throughout the table, which the reader can verify for 
his/herself. 
In the ri^t-hand section of the table, the effects of changes in 
wealth (for a constant level of C) are illustrated. Assuming that 'WT, WB, 
and BR change in proportion to one another, an increase in WT does, as 
* 
expected, tend to cause (S/N) to increase. For example, if K = 164,476, 
Ug = 3, and A = 39,517, (S/N)* rises from 1/30,000 to 1/20,000 to 1/15,000 
as WT rises from $50,000 to $100,000 to $150,000, As with cost changes, 
the "wealth effect" seems to be more pronounced as K increases, implying 
a greater wealth elasticity as the frequency of alarms falls. To 
illustrate, compare the above situation to the case vAiere K = 263,162. 
* 
Here, as wealth increases over the same range, (S/N) increases from 
1/45,000 to 1/30,000 to 1/20,000. 
* 
Finally, for any given WE, an increase in K, or A causes (S/N) 
to fall. Once again, the integers problem seems to cloud the issue, but 
the trend is definitely observable. 
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APPENDIX E: RISK NEUTRALITY MD INDIRECT UTILITY FONCTIONS 
It is sometimes necessary to determine if a utility function is risk 
neutral (or risk averse) in terms of a parameter tiiich is not directly in 
the utility function. Such is the case in the text vàiere utility is a 
function of non-tennis expenditures, tennis playing, and leisure, it is 
necessary to test for neutrality with respect to the "price" of tennis 
playing. In this situation, one must convert the (direct) utility function 
into an indirect utility function, v&iich defines utility in terms of 
income and prices rather than in terms of goods, services, and leisure. 
If the indirect utility function is linear with respect to the parameter 
in question, then the direct utility function is risk neutral with respect 
to that parameter. 
To illustrate the idea, let us consider a utility function of the 
form 
U = x^^z'^ 
where a + b + c = 1 and X, Y, and Z are private goods with prices P^, P^, 
and Pg. Suppose that the individual has income I, and one wants to know 
whether he or she is risk-neutral with respect to that income. 
The first step is to derive the demand curves for X, Y, and Z from 
the first order conditions for utility maximization. Mathematically, 
maximize U = X^^Z^ subject to the constraint that I = P^X + P^Y + p^Z. 
The Lagrangian is 
L = X^Y^Z^ + x[l - P^X - PyY - PgZ] 
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and the first order conditions are 
S - T* = 0 
# = 2' - XPy = 0 
g = cx' Y' zC-1 - XP, . 0 
I = I - P^X - PYÏ - P 2^ = 0 . 
Solving these equations for X, Y, and Z gives one the demand curves: 
y 
• 
Substituting these values back into the utility function gives one 
the utility maximum, given prices and income: 
U = (X*)^ (Y*)^ (Z*)^ . 
* * * 
Substitution in the values of X , Y , and Z gives one the indirect 
utility function, V, in terms of prices and income: 
V = (f^ ) (^ ) (f^ ) 
X y z 
? = (#-/ &)" (f-)°. 
X y z 
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Recall that a + b + c = 1, and that P^, P^, and P^ are constants. 
Thus, 
V = I-k 
where 
k = (f-)^  (|-)^  (f-)'' 
X y z 
and k is a constant. Indirect utility is therefore a linear function of 
income, so the original utility function is said to be risk-neutral with 
respect to income. Note, however, that this particular utility function is 
not risk neutral in the prices of the goods, since the indirect utility 
function is not linear in prices. 
With respect to the problem in the text, it might be sufficient to 
treat the problem as if individuals were risk neutral with respect to 
the price of playing tennis since it is typically such a small fraction of 
total expenditures. 
